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Introduction
Generational accounting is a new way of con-
sidering how government deficits, taxes, trans-
fer payments, and other expenditures impact
the distribution of income and wealth among
various generations.
1 The technique is still be-
ing refined, and a number of the assumptions
used to estimate the accounts are controver-
sial.
2 Further development will be needed to
improve the quality of the estimates and the
usefulness of the method.
Generational accounts indicate, in present-
value terms, the average net taxes (taxes paid
less transfers received) that members of each
generation can expect to pay both now and in
the future. This is shown for existing as well as
future generations. The method can also be
used to calculate a given generation's lifetime
net tax rate, defined as the present value of
the net taxes it pays as a percentage of its life-
time labor income.
• 1 See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) and Kotlikoff (1992).
• 2 The merits of generational accounting are debated in Auerbach,
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1994) and Haveman (1994).
Generational accounts for 1991 were pre-
sented in the 1993:IQ issue of this publication.
That article explained the basic concept and
provided some examples of how the accounts
would be affected by policy changes. It also re-
ported lifetime net tax rates by generation, be-
ginning in 1900. The present article provides
baseline generational accounts for 1992, esti-
mates the effect of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93), and examines
the further effects of the administration's health
care reform proposal.
Our analysis reaches the following major
conclusions:
• The lifetime net tax rates of baby boomers
and later generations will be higher than the
rates paid by those born earlier.
• Future generations' lifetime net tax rate will
be much higher than the rates estimated for
existing generations.
• OBRA93 will significantly lower the life-
time net tax rate facing future generations.
• The lifetime net tax rate facing future gen-
erations will be still lower if federal outlays
and receipts are altered to equal those pro-
jected by the administration under its health





The federal budget normally measures receipts
and outlays for one year at a time and shows
these estimates for only a few years into the
future; Moreover, while the standard budget
presentation divides receipts and outlays into a
number of categories, it does not do so in a
way that reveals the effects of the budget on
different generations.
Generational accounts, in contrast, look
ahead many decades and classify taxes paid
and transfers received (such as Social Security,
Medicare, and food stamps) according to the
generation that pays or receives the money. For
an existing generation, taxes and transfers are
estimated year by year over its entire remaining
lifespan. These amounts are then summarized
in terms of one number, the present value of
the generation's entire annual series of average
future tax payments net of transfers received.
For future generations, the accounts estimate
net tax payments based on the proposition
that any government bills not paid by current
generations will accrue to them. Future genera-
tions' average payment to the government,
above the amount they will receive in trans-
fers, assumes that total government spending
remains on its projected path and that those
now alive do not pay more than anticipated.
Defined more precisely, generational ac-
counts measure, as of a particular base year,
the present value of the average future taxes
that a member of each generation will pay mi-
nus the present value of the average future
transfers that he or she will receive. This differ-
ence is called the "net tax" in the following dis-
cussion. A generation is defined as all males or
females born in a given year.
The generational accounts as such — that is,
these net tax payments — are prospective in
that they consider only the present value of fu-
ture taxes and transfers as of a base year. A
prospective analysis can do two things: It can
estimate the effect of policy changes, because
all of these effects occur in the future, and it
can compare the lifetime net taxes of the newly
born and future generations, because their en-
tire lifetime taxes and transfers are also in the
future. It cannot, however, compare the life-
time net taxes paid by one existing generation
with those of either a different existing genera-
tion or future generations, because part of any
living generation's taxes and transfers occurred
in the past and thus are not taken into account.
A comparison of one existing generation
with another, or with future generations, must
be based on their entire lifetime taxes and
transfers. The lifetime net tax rate of a genera-
tion represents the present value of its lifetime
net taxes divided by the present value of its
lifetime labor income. Present values are calcu-
lated as of the generation's year of birth in or-
der to facilitate a comparison of the lifetime
fiscal treatment of different generations. Be-
cause lifetime taxes, transfers, and income have
tended to rise over time and have fluctuated to
some extent, we compare the relative net taxes
paid by various generations in terms of lifetime
net tax rates rather than in terms of the abso-
lute amounts of lifetime net tax payments.
Generational accounting can be used for two
types of comparisons. First, it can compare the
lifetime net taxes of future generations, of the
generation just born, and of different generations
born in the past. The lifetime net taxes of genera-
tions born in the past are based on estimates of
actual taxes paid and transfers received through
1992, and on projections of taxes to be paid and
transfers to be received in the future.
Second, the accounts can be used to compare
the effects of actual or proposed policy changes
on the remaining lifetime net tax payments of
current and future generations. Such compari-
sons may be made in terms of either lifetime net
tax rates or the absolute amounts of the genera-
tional accounts, because the changes in all life-
time taxes and transfers occur in the future for
every generation and thus are included in the
calculations. The comparisons can be made
equally well for policies that 1) alter total re-
ceipts or expenditures while also changing the
deficit, 2) alter the composition of receipts or
expenditures without changing the deficit, and
3) alter the level of receipts and expenditures
together without changing the deficit.
Unfortunately, generational accounts have a
number of limitations as currently constructed.
First, they include the taxes and transfers of all
levels of government — federal, state, and local.
While this approach is appropriate for some
analyses, it does not allow us to separate the ef-
fect of the federal budget from that of the state
and local sector. However, the difference in gen-
erational accounts due to a federal government
policy change can be analyzed separately.
Second, generational accounts reflect only
taxes paid and transfers received. They do not
impute to particular generations the value of
government purchases of goods and servicesthat provide them with education, highways,
national defense, and so on. Therefore, the
numbers do not reveal the full net benefit or
burden that any generation receives from gov-
ernment fiscal policy as a whole. Insofar as the
benefits of purchases could be imputed, they
would reduce net tax payments. This omission
may be important, because government pur-
chases of goods and services account for about
half of total government expenditures. Never-
theless, generational accounts can reveal a gen-
eration's net benefit or burden from a particular
policy change that affects only taxes and trans-
fers. Although the accounts do not show how
the benefits of government purchases are spread
across generations, they do illuminate which
generations will pay for this spending.
Third, generational accounts do not yet incor-
porate any policy feedback on the economy's
growth and interest rates. Feedback effects can
be significant, but because they generally oc-
cur slowly, their impact on the discounted val-
ues used in the accounts is likely to be small.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that they
would reinforce the conclusions derived in this
chapter. For example, policies that decrease
the net tax payment of existing generations and
increase the payment of future generations are
likely to stimulate more current consumption
and thereby reduce the savings available to
finance investment. This, in turn, would lower
productivity and real wage growth and raise
real interest rates, which on balance would
harm future generations.
Finally, generational accounting divides people
born in the same year into only two categories,
males and females, with each designated a "gen-
eration." This is an important distinction, since the
sexes differ significantly in characteristics such as
lifetime earnings and longevity. However, the ac-
counts do not reveal differences with respect to
other characteristics, such as income level or race,
nor do they show the wide diversity among indi-
viduals within any grouping. The categories
would be expanded if more data were available.
Lifetime net tax rates introduce a number of
further conceptual issues. For example, how
should lifetime income be measured? Lifetime in-
come is defined as a present value, like lifetime
taxes and transfers. The present-value calculation
should factor in all income that increases a gen-
eration's resources, including labor earnings, in-
herited wealth, and capital gains over and
above the normal return to saving. The normal
return to saving is not included in income, be-
cause that would be double counting. Saving
out of labor income and then earning a normal
rate of return does not increase the present
value of a household's resources. Data do not
exist on the share of each generation's income
that stems from inherited wealth or supernor-
mal capital gains, so labor earnings are used to
represent income.^
Even within the scope of generational ac-
counts as now constmcted, the results presented
here should be viewed as experimental and illus-
trative. They are limited by the availability and
quality of the data, especially for earlier years.
Lifetime net tax rates are calculated from histori-
cal data on taxes, transfers, and income up to
1992 as well as on projections of future data. The
historical information, however, is sparse com-
pared to the data for recent years and in some
cases is not available at all. As work on genera-
tional accounting progresses, the estimates will
likely be revised due to improvements in the
data and refinements in the method. Some of the
changes that have occurred since last year are
discussed in the appendix.
In addition, generational accounts are neces-
sarily based on a number of simplifying assump-
tions about which reasonable people may dis-
agree. For instance, government intergenerational
redistribution does not substitute for, and is not
offset by, private intergenerational transfers in
our calculations. This is similar to the usual as-
sumption made in cross-section estimates of the
distributional effect of taxes and transfers by in-
come class or other characteristic. The accounts
are also based on assumptions about the pattern
of future taxes and spending, the interest rate
used to discount future taxes and transfers to
form present values, mortality and birth rates,
and so forth. The absolute amounts of the gen-
erational accounts are sensitive to all of these.
Projections of government expenditures are
especially affected by assumptions about
health care costs. From 9 percent of GDP in
1980, health care expenditures have risen to 14
percent currently and have been projected to
reach more than 20 percent of total output
early in the next century unless constrained by
cost controls. The government pays about 45
percent of all health care costs, and its bill has
been rising more rapidly than the private sec-
tor's; thus, future trends in government spend-
ing will be strongly influenced by future trends
in health care costs. The estimates without
• 3 The error due to this omission is relatively small in the aggre-
gate, given that labor income has long accounted for approximately four-
fifths of all income and that only part of the remaining income from
capital should be included. However, errors for different generations
could vary depending on trends and fluctuations in asset values and be-
quest behavior.TABLE 1
Lifetime Net Tax Rates
before 0BRA93 (percent)




































































health care reform reflect continued rapid
growth in costs, but the probable pattern is un-
certain.
Despite these qualifications, generational ac-
counts can be useful when considered in light of
their assumptions, as is the case for the 75-year
projections made annually by the Social Security
trustees. Moreover, our most fundamental result
— that future generations' net tax payment will
be relatively much larger than that of the newly
born or other existing generations — holds for a
wide range of reasonable changes in the assump-
tions. The following sections illustrate the results
of generational accounting.
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It. Lifetime Net Tax
Rates before Deficit
Reduction
Table 1 reports where lifetime net tax rates for
different generations stood before OBRA93 was
enacted. Rates are shown for the generations
born in 1900 and every tenth year thereafter,
for the generation born in 1992 (the "newly
born" in this year's analysis), and for future
generations (those born in 1993 or later). All
federal, state, and local taxes and transfers are
included in the calculations, and data for
males and females are combined.
5 The calcula-
tions in this table and throughout the article are
as of calendar year 1992. Because of the time
needed to prepare these estimates, we based
them on receipts and outlays reported in the
Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
Mid-Session Review of the 1994 Budget rather
than on the current budget. Since the budget
outlook has improved since the Mid-Session Re-
view was issued, the lifetime net tax rates for
both existing and future generations would
probably fall if based on the updated numbers.
Lifetime net tax rates have exhibited a
strong upward trend over the past century, ris-
ing from 23.6 percent for the generation born
in 1900 to 35.4 - 36.0 percent for those born
since 1970.
6 The rate for future generations
was much higher before OBRA93 was enacted
— 93-7 percent, or 165.1 percent greater than
the lifetime net tax rate facing the newly born.
7
Table 1 also breaks down the net tax rates be-
tween gross rates and transfer rates, To calculate
the latter, the present value of a generation's life-
time taxes (or transfers) is divided by the present
value of its lifetime labor income. This decompo-
sition reveals the expanded role of government
transfer payments over the past century. The life-
time transfer rate more than quadrupled be-
tween 1900 and 1992, starting at 3.7 percent and
rising each decade to a rate of 16.2 percent. The
increase was more rapid, in both relative and
absolute terms, for the generations born before
World War II than afterward.
The gross tax rate has risen substantially
more than the net tax rate. It nearly doubled
between the generations born in 1900 and
1992, starting at 27.3 percent and increasing
each decade to a rate of 51.5 percent. In con-
trast, the net tax rate rose by about half. The
larger increase in the gross tax rate is because
a generation's lifetime gross taxes pay for the
• 4 For a detailed explanation o( the concepts, data sources, calcula-
tions, and other assumptions used here, see Auerbach, Gokhale, and
Kotlikoff (1993).
• 5 Data lor the sexes were combined because of the conceptual prob-
lem of how to attribute taxes, transfers, and income within a family. For a
description of the methodology and data sources used in the underlying cal-
culations, see the appendix to Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1993).
• 6 The lifetime net tax rate for the generation born in 1900 was esti-
mated as 21.5 percent last year. The increase is primarily due to a reduc-
tion in the estimate of its lifetime labor earnings. This revision also raises
the lifetime net tax rate of generations born after 1900, including future
generations, by roughly 10 percent.
• 7 For a discussion of the equitable distribution of net tax burdens
over different generations, see Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1994),TABLE 2
Percentage Difference in Net
Payments between Future
Generations and A"e Zero
Productivity Growth Rate













SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget (1993).
government's purchases of goods and services
as well as for public transfers to its own mem-
bers and other generations.
Estimates of lifetime net tax rates by genera-
tion, such as those shown in table 1, are affected
by the amounts of future taxes, transfers, and
other government expenditures that are as-
sumed year by year in the underlying projec-
tions. These assumptions differ widely, and the
amounts that result could vary substantially
based on the figures chosen. The projection
methods generally seek to maintain current pol-
icy in some sense. However, "current policy"
can be interpreted in various ways, especially
for discretionary expenditures such as defense.
Furthermore, the long-term projections for Med-
icare and Medicaid assume that even if the ad-
ministration's health care reform initiative fails,
other policy actions or forces will eventually
hold spending growth to the overall rate of eco-
nomic expansion (adjusted for shifts in the age
and sex composition of the population), al-
though the projected growth rate is still quite
rapid relative to GDP for the next few decades.
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Lifetime net tax rates — and hence the im-
balance between future and existing genera-
tions — are defined in such a way that the
generations now alive, including the newly
born, do not pay any more taxes (or receive
any less transfers) than projected under the
specified fiscal policy. This assumption is an
analytical device for determining the size of
the fiscal imbalance; it is not meant to suggest
that future generations will in fact close the
gap all by themselves. Any actual policy
change, whether enacted in the past or pro-
posed for the future, is almost certain to bear
in some degree on generations now living as
well as on the unborn. Thus, if a policy change
were implemented today, the net tax rates
paid by the newly born and other existing gen-
erations would be different than those shown
in table 1. Policy changes of this kind are con-
sidered below.
The generational imbalance shown in table 1
depends on the assumption that all future genera-
tions of the same sex have the same lifetime net
tax rate. Alternatively, suppose that generations
born during 1993-2000 pay the same lifetime
net tax rate as those born in 1992. Because these
future generations would pay less than otherwise
assumed, those born after 2000 would have to
pay more. The greater the number of future gen-
erations who pay no more than the newly born,
the larger is the lifetime net tax rate that will be
required of those generations born still later.
The size of the imbalance estimated between
future generations and the newly born is also
sensitive to assumptions about both the interest
rate used for discounting future payments and re-
ceipts and the growth rate of the economy. Table
2 shows the percentage differential under interest
rates of 3.0, 6.0, and 9.0 percent and productivity
growth rates of 0.25, 0.75, and 1.25 percent. The
assumptions used for all other calculations in this
article are a 6 percent interest rate and a 0.75 per-
cent growth rate. This leads to a 165.1 percent
larger net payment by future generations than by
the newly born. Under the alternatives in table 2,
the difference ranges from 93 percent to 350 per-
cent. While this spread is wide, our basic conclu-
sion still holds for all of the alternatives; that is,
future generations will face a much larger tax
bill, net of transfers received, than the generation
just born or other existing generations.
III. Effects
of 0BRA93
0BRA93 slashed the estimated budget deficits
from 1994 through 1998 by a cumulative total of
about $500 billion. As a result, the lifetime net
tax rate of future generations is reduced from
93.7 percent to 82.0 percent (see table 3). To ac-
complish this, the Act raises the lifetime net tax
rate on existing generations: The very young will
pay roughly 1 percentage point more, baby
boomers about 0.3 to 0.6 percentage point more,
and older generations less than 0.3 percentage
point more. The lower impact on the elderly is
partly because they have fewer remaining years
of life to be affected, and also because any given
dollar amount of taxes or transfers is discounted
over more years in order to calculate the present
value as of a generation's year of birth.
• 8 A pure extrapolation of recent trends, in contrast, implies that
health care costs will eventually bankrupt the government.^^^^^m TAB



















































































Percentage Difference in Net Payment
165.1 126.0
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget (1993).
73.9 108.8
OBRA93 thus narrows the gap between the
lifetime net tax rates of future and existing gen-
erations. The generational imbalance — defined
as the percentage difference in lifetime net tax
rates between future generations and the newly
born — is reduced by about a fourth, from
165.1 percent to 126.0 percent. These calcula-
tions show roughly where lifetime net tax rates
now stand. The main reason the generational
imbalance remains substantial despite OBRA93
is that, to a great extent, government health
care spending is projected to continue rising
rapidly relative to GDP.
IV. Effects of Health
Care Reform
The administration's health care reform initia-
tive would provide every American with com-
prehensive medical benefits and would limit
the rapid growth of health care costs as a share
of GDP. If future health care outlays are re-
duced and revenues are increased as projected
under the Clinton plan, the current generational
imbalance would be substantially reduced.
9
Table 3 reports lifetime net tax rates with health
care reform. Under the Clinton plan, future
generations would see their net rate of taxa-
tion reduced beyond the effect of OBRA93 —
from 82.0 percent to 66.5 percent. Because esti-
mates of the effect of health care reform on
taxes and spending are not available after 2000,
this calculation is based on rough projections
for subsequent years. Medicare and Medicaid
transfers are assumed to grow at a rate similar
to that of benefits under the reform package,
although neither program is directly limited by
the administration's plan. Our estimates do not
include the premiums paid to health alliances
or the benefits financed by these premiums.
Health care reform would increase the life-
time net tax rates of all existing generations by
decreasing the lifetime transfers that they
would be recorded as receiving. This is be-
cause government health care spending is re-
corded as a direct transfer to the individuals
receiving the care. However, one of the basic
principles of the administration's proposal is to
reduce the complexity and improve the effi-
ciency of the current health care system. To
the extent that the plan succeeds, it will allow
lower government transfer payments, but peo-
ple will not receive less health care. Thus, the
measured decline in lifetime transfers to exist-
ing generations would overstate the change in
the value of benefits they receive, and the in-
crease in the lifetime net tax rates from this
effect would not represent a rise in their actual
fiscal burden.
As shown in table 3, the administration's
plan reduces the generational imbalance by
about two-fifths, from 126.0 percent to 73.9
percent. In combination, OBRA93 and health
care reform would eliminate more than half of
the previous imbalance of 165.1 percent.
Table 3 also illustrates the importance of im-
plementing the cost-containment principle of
health care reform. Column 4 reports lifetime
net tax rates with the administration's proposal
modified so that all government health care
transfers from 2000 through 2020 grow 2 per-
centage points faster than warranted by demo-
graphic change and economywide productivity
growth. In this case, the generational imbalance
would be reduced from 126.0 percent to only
108.8 percent.
• 9 Our calculations are based on the OMB's projections of changes
in revenues and expenditures that would follow adoption of the admini-
stration's health care reform proposal.TABLE 4
Generational Accounts for Males:




































































































































































































































of transfers that he or she will receive. The
other columns show the average present val-
Tables 4 and 5 provide a complementary per-
spective to lifetime net tax rates by presenting,
in absolute amounts, the net tax payments for
different generations based solely on those
taxes and transfers to be paid or received in the
future. These are the "generational accounts"
as defined previously and as emphasized in
most presentations of the method. The ac-
counts in the year of a generation's birth are
the same as its lifetime net tax payments.
The numbers in these tables represent the
generational accounts as of calendar year 1992
for every fifth generation alive in that year. The
first column, "net tax payment," is the difference
between the present value of taxes that a mem-
ber of each generation will pay, on average, over
ues of different taxes and transfers. As with life-
time net tax rates, all federal, state, and local
taxes and transfers are factored into these cal-
culations. Federal spending and receipts in-




The present value of future taxes to be paid by
young and middle-aged generations far exceeds
the present value of the future transfers they will
receive. For males age 40 in 1992 — a group that
is close to its peak taxpaying years — the pres-
ent value of future taxes is $170,900 more thanTABLE 5
Generational Accounts for Females:
























































































































































































































the present value of future transfers. For new-
born males, on the other hand, the comparable
figure is much smaller, $78,400, because they
will pay minimal taxes for a number of years.
Older generations, who are largely retired,
will receive more Social Security, Medicare,
and other future benefits than they will pay in
future taxes. That is, they have negative net tax
payments. Females will have smaller net pay-
ments than males, mostly because they earn
less and therefore pay lower income and So-
cial Security taxes.
Because the figures in these tables show the
remaining lifetime net tax payments of particu-
lar generations, they do not include taxes paid
or transfers received in the past. This should be
kept in mind when considering the net tax pay-
ments of those now alive. The portion of a
generation's lifetime net payment that remains
depends on whether its members are 10, 40, or
65 years old. The fact that 40-year-old males can
expect to pay more in the future than they re-
ceive, in present-value terms, while the reverse is
true for 65-year-old males, does not mean that
the government is treating 40-year-olds unfairly.
Men who are now 65 paid substantial taxes when
younger, and these amounts are not reflected in
the remaining lifetime net tax payments shown
in their generational accounts. Thus, the remain-
ing lifetime payment of one existing generation
cannot be compared directly with that of another.
The lifetime payment of existing generations can
be compared, however, using the net tax rates
presented previously.
Tables 4 and 5 also show the different gen-
erational effects of various taxes and transfers.
For example, the present value of future labor
income taxes and payroll taxes is much higher
for generations 60 years of age or less than for
older generations, whereas the present valueTABLE 6
Generational Accounts under Different

































































































































































Percentage Difference in Net Payment

















































of future capital income taxes and excise taxes
is somewhat higher for those under 60. This is
because the elderly tend to retire from the la-
bor force, but still own homes and buy goods
and services subject to property tax, sales tax,
and other excises. As another example, the
present value of Social Security and health
care transfers is much higher for the elderly
than for the young and middle-aged, because
these kinds of transfers primarily accrue to the
elderly and thus are discounted in the calcula-
tions over relatively few years. Welfare benefits,
on the other hand, provide comparatively large
benefits to the young, so their present value is
higher for these age groups than for others.
Net Tax Payments by
Future Generations
The estimates in tables 4 and 5 show that fu-
ture generations will have to pay 126.0 percent
more to the government, on average, than
those born in 1992. The $177,100 average net
tax payment for future males and the $99,600
payment for future females are calculated as-
suming that the ratio of net tax payments by
males to that of females is the same for future
generations as for those born in 1992.
The numbers also assume that all future
Americans of a particular sex will make the
same average net tax payment over their life-
times after adjusting for overall economic
growth. This growth adjustment is needed be-
cause future generations will pay more in taxes,
net of the transfers received, simply because
their incomes will be higher. This does notrepresent a heavier fiscal burden. To properly
assess the net tax payment by future genera-
tions relative to the newly born, it is necessary
to calculate the net payment they will make
above and beyond the amount due to economic
growth. The generational accounts assume that
all future generations pay the same net taxes
apart from the effect of growth. This net tax is
the number shown in the tables for all future
generations of the same sex.
0BRA93 and Health
Care Reform
Table 6 displays the generational accounts for
the three policy regimes previously evaluated
using lifetime net tax rates: a baseline before
the enactment of OBRA93, estimates including
OBRA93 (as shown in more detail in tables 4
and 5), and estimates including both OBRA93
and health care reform.
These numbers represent a different way of
viewing the generational effects of policy
changes and complement the effects of life-
time net tax rates revealed in table 3- OBRA93
and health care reform substantially reduce the
generational imbalance between future anci liv-
ing generations. The net tax payments of fu-
ture males (in present value) are reduced by
both policies: $25,400 by OBRA93 and $32,400
by health care reform. For females, the compa-
rable figures are $14,200 and $19,900. Each ex-
isting generation pays a larger net amount in
present value, but the increase is not as much
as the reduction for future generations. For ex-
ample, 50-year-old males pay $5,100 more due
to OBRA93 and $10,100 more due to health
care reform. As explained above, the lower
transfer payments under the health care initia-
tive do not represent less care to the extent
that they reflect a more efficient system.
VI. Conclusion
The generational accounting exercise presented
here reveals a severe imbalance in current fis-
cal policy, in that future generations will have
to remit a huge portion of their lifetime income
to the government if the tax treatment of cur-
rent generations remains unchanged. Under
post-OBRA93 policy, this share is estimated at
82 percent.
We do not mean to imply, however, that
such a massive burden will necessarily be
borne by future generations. By pointing out
the dire consequences of continuing on our
current policy path, this analysis suggests that
legislative changes are imperative. Thus, the re-
sults of this exercise, should be viewed as a
projection based on the assumption that cur-
rent policies will remain in force for the forsee-






The imbalance in the lifetime net tax rate be-
tween future generations and those born in 1992
is estimated at 165.1 percent before taking into
account OBRA93 and health care reform. This
baseline figure is much higher than the 111.1
percent estimated a year ago between future
generations and those born in 1991.
1
0 Half of
the difference can be traced to incorporating the
Health Care Financing Administration's projec-
tion of Medicaid transfers through 2004 instead
of assuming that these amounts will remain con-
stant relative to GDP at the last actual ratio. If last
year's method had been used, the current imbal-
ance would be 145.0 percent.
The jump from 111.1 to 145.0 percent can be
attributed to three factors: First, one more genera-
tion — those born in 1992 — will not make the
higher lifetime net tax payments required of fu-
ture generations. As a result, those born after
1992 will have still larger bills to pay. This effect
accounts for about 8 percentage points of the in-
crease. Second, of the remaining difference, a lit-
tle less than half reflects the use of actual 1992
aggregate taxes, transfers, and purchases rather
than projections. The rest of the increase can be
explained by improvements in the cross-section
profiles used to distribute taxes and transfers by
age and sex, as well as to interactions among the
various factors.
10 See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1993).References
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